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Most technical standards-development organizations (SDOs) have adopted internal policies 
embodying “due process” criteria such openness, balance of interest, consensus decision 
making and appeals. Yet these criteria lack a generally-accepted definition and the manner in 
which they are implemented varies among SDOs. Recently, there has been a renewed interest 
in the principle that SDOs should ensure a balance of interests among their stakeholders. This 
article explores the origins and meaning of the balance requirement for SDOs. In doing so, it 
identifies four “tiers” of balance requirements, ranging from those required of all SDOs under 
applicable antitrust law, to those required of SDOs that wish to benefit from particular 
statutory and accreditation schemes, to those that are purely voluntary. Beyond first tier 
balance requirements, which prohibit anticompetitive attempts to skew decision making 
processes within an SDO, the imposition of greater degrees of balance among SDO 
stakeholders, whether through numerical quotas or affirmative participant recruitment efforts, 
are largely voluntary and dependent on an SDO’s policy preferences. 
In 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Standards Association 
(IEEE-SA) amended its patent policy.1 The amendments were approved by the association’s 
Standards Board, Board of Governors and Board of Directors,2 and the procedure for adopting 
them were the subject of a favorable Business Review Letter from the U.S. Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ).3 Nevertheless, a number of IEEE-SA members opposed the 
amendments, arguing (among other things) that they were unduly biased against the interests of 
companies that derive significant revenue from the licensing of patents 4  (what I have 
previously termed “Patent-Centric” firms5). Both before and after adoption of the amendments, 
opponents argued, among other things, that their interests were not adequately represented on 
the “ad hoc committee” that initially drafted the amendments considered by the voting bodies 
noted above.6 As such, they claimed that IEEE-SA, in adopting these amendments, “failed to 
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a group discussed in this article, and as a member of both ASTM and
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1 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE], IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, § 6.1 (Mar. 2015).
2  Michael A. Lindsay & Konstantinos Karachalios, Updating a Patent Policy: The IEEE Experience, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2015(2), at 4.
3 Business Review Letter from Hon. Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P. (Feb. 2, 2015).
4 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. 
INNOVATION 301 (2016).
5 Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53
JURIMETRICS 163,  (2013)
6 See Sidak, supra note 4, at 314-16.
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achieve the balancing of interests” that its own rules require for the development of technical 
standards.7 
 
NSS Labs, Inc. offers testing services for cybersecurity products and is a member of the 
Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization, Inc. (AMTSO), an SDO that develops 
cybersecurity software standards. In 2018, NSS sued AMTSO and several of its members, 
alleging that they violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by (1) colluding to develop standards 
that disadvantaged certain testing vendors and then (2) refusing to deal with vendors who did 
not comply with those standards.8 NSS argued that the SDO and its members were liable both 
on a per se basis (e.g., for a group boycott) and under the rule of reason. AMTSO (through one 
of its principal members Symantec) filed a motion to dismiss, among other things, with respect 
to NSS’s claims of per se liability. 9  AMTSO/Symantec argued that under the Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (SDOAA),10 an SDO is not subject to 
per se liability under the Sherman Act while engaged in “standards development activity”.11  
 
But in June, 2019, the DOJ intervened in the case, arguing that the court should not 
dismiss NSS’s per se liability claims, as a question of fact exists regarding AMTSO’s 
qualification as an SDO under the SDOAA.12 Specifically, the DOJ notes that the SDOAA 
defines an SDO as an organization that “plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates voluntary 
consensus standards using procedures that incorporate the attributes of openness, balance of 
                                                 
7 Id. at 315. The IEEE controversy highlights an important distinction between SDO rules and procedures for the 
development of technical standards versus those for the creation and amendment of SDO policy (e.g., relating to 
patents). One recent study finds that many SDOs have significantly different procedures for these two functions. 
Justus Baron, Jorge Contreras, Martin Husovec & Pierre Larouche, Making the Rules: The Governance of 
Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy 
Report EUR 29655 at 989-112 (Nikolaus Thumm, ed., Mar. 2019) [hereinafter JRC Report].  Because the body of 
literature and case law regarding standardization addresses balance requirements primarily in the context of 
standards-development (rather than SDO policy development), this article focuses on the former. Nevertheless, 
useful analogies can be drawn to discussions of SDO policy development. 
8 NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711, Complaint (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 18, 2018) 
[hereinafter NSS Complaint]. 
9 NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711, Defendant Symantec Corporation’s Motion to 
Dismiss (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 2018). 
10 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306. 
11 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (“In any action under the antitrust laws … the conduct of … a standards development 
organization while engaged in a standards development activity, shall not be deemed illegal per se; such conduct 
shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition, 
including, but not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research, development, product, 
process, and service markets”). 
12 NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711, Statement of Interest of the United States (N.D. 
Cal., filed Jun. 26, 2019). The DOJ does not otherwise appear to be a party to the NSS case, nor does the case 
appear to arise from a DOJ investigation or enforcement action. Thus, the author assumes that the DOJ submitted 
its Statement of Interest in this case in its “advocacy role”. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen. 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t Justice, The Long Run: Maximizing Innovation Incentives Through Advocacy and 
Enforcement, Keynote Address at LeadershIP Conference on IP, Antitrust, and Innovation Policy 7–8 (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1050956/download (explaining that as an “advocate”, as opposed 
to an “enforcer”, the DOJ will “clarify what conditions are ideal” for competition, while “at the opposite end of 
the spectrum, what conduct might attract enforcement scrutiny.”) See also Jorge L. Contreras, Taking it to the 
Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Toward Standards Development, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 66, 77 (Fall 
2018) (discussing DOJ enforcement versus advocacy roles). 
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interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus…” 13  Yet, as alleged in NSS’s 
Complaint, “AMTSO’s membership consists principally of cybersecurity companies [with] 
only a small number of companies who provide testing services…”14 Accordingly, the DOJ 
reasons that AMTSO may not be in compliance with the balance requirement of the SDOAA, 
and if not, AMTSO would not qualify as an SDO entitled to the SDOAA’s shield against per se 
liability. 
 
The recent emergence of SDO balance issues in the IEEE and NSS cases, coupled with 
the DOJ’s separate indication that it intends to increase its scrutiny of collective behavior 
within SDOs (particularly if they disadvantage Patent-Centric firms),15 warrants a renewed 
look at the history and interpretation of SDO balance requirements.16 This article reviews the 
history of such balance requirements and offers suggestions regarding their interpretation and 
intent.  
 
Balance and Quotas 
 
Non-governmental SDOs have operated in the United States and Europe for more than 
a century, serving as neutral fora for the collaborative development of technical interoperability 
standards and protocols. In order to achieve broad acceptance and legitimacy of their standards, 
SDOs have long sought some degree of balance among their members, typically welcoming 
active participation by product manufacturers, product users and unaffiliated experts.17 SDO 
stakeholders have broadly identified “balance of interest” as a desirable feature of SDOs.18 
 
While in many cases such balance was achieved informally by working group chairs 
and other SDO leaders, some SDOs such ASTM International adopted formal policies 
requiring that technical committees have minimum levels of representation from defined 
stakeholder categories (e.g., producer, user and consumer).19 Other SDOs required that in order 
for standards documents to be approved, a minimum number of votes from each of several 
                                                 
13 Id. at 2. 
14 NSS Complaint, supra note 8, at 13. 
15 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t Justice, Take it to the Limit: 
Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law, Address Before the USC Gould School of 
Law (Nov. 10, 2017); See also Contreras, supra note 12 (analyzing shift in DOJ policy toward SDOs). 
16 The focus of this article is on U.S. law and policy. However, it is worth noting that similar balance requirements 
for SDOs exist in both international agreements and European Union law.  For a summary of these non-U.S. 
requirements, see JRC Report, supra note 7, at 43-46 and 119-21. 
17 JOANNE YATES & CRAIG N. MURPHY, ENGINEERING RULES: GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING SINCE 1880 at 9, 194 
(2019). 
18 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 119 (89% of surveyed stakeholders believed that “SDOs should ensure balance 
among different types of stakeholders when considering a significant new policy or policy change”). 
19  ASTM Intl., Regulations Governing ASTM Technical Committees § 3.1.1 (2018) (defining “balance” as 
occurring “when the combined number of voting user, consumer, and general interest members equals or exceeds 
the number of voting producer members”) and § 3.2.1 (requiring that “Balance must be achieved before any 
standards are brought before a classified subcommittee or main committee for ballot”). See, also, Robert W. 
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1352-55 (1978) (observations of ASTM’s mandatory balance rules in 
practice).   
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designated stakeholder categories must be attained. 20  I refer to these numerical category 
balancing requirements as “quotas”. 
 
In observing the practical operation of the mandatory quota requirement at ASTM, 
Professor Robert Hamilton noted that while formal voting committees at ASTM do, indeed, 
hew to these quota requirements, much of the detailed standards-development work at ASTM 
is conducted by smaller expert working groups that largely represent the industrial sector.21 
Quota requirements present challenges both in defining useful stakeholder categories and 
ensuring that selected representatives of those categories actually represent the interests of 
other members of the category.22 What’s more, when categories include stakeholders who are 
diffuse or lack sufficient expertise or financial resources to engage substantively in SDO 
deliberations, it is often difficult to secure their meaningful participation in SDO activities.23 
Finally, quotas themselves may unfairly skew SDO decision making when the representatives 
of very small stakeholder groups are given the same voting privileges as representatives of 
much larger or more technically or economically significant groups. As such, it is not clear that 
mandatory quota requirements actually achieve their goals, or that such goals are even 
attainable in a practical sense.24 
 
 
The Codification of Balance Requirements Under OMB Circular A-119 
 
 During the negotiation of the Tokyo round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in the 1970s, officials in the Ford Administration, who were pressing to include 
a Standards Code in the GATT Agreement, decided that it would be expedient to have a 
formalized U.S. standardization policy that could be used as a model in international 
negotiations.25 Accordingly, in 1976 the administration’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) proposed a draft policy which was debated for the next four years.26  The finalized 
policy was released as OMB Circular A-119 in January 1980.27 
 
For purposes of the 1980 Circular, “voluntary standards bodies” were defined as 
“nongovernmental bodies which are broadly based, multi-member, domestic and multinational 
organizations including, for example, non-profit organizations, industry associations, and 
                                                 
20 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 121 (discussing balance in voting requirements at DVB Project and ETSI). 
21 Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1355 (“One is left with the overall impression of extensive industrial participation in 
and domination of the process”). 
22 Id. 
23 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 121 and 169-70 (reporting difficulty that some SDOs have experienced in 
convincing certain stakeholder groups, particularly consumers, to invest time and effort in SDO deliberations). 
24 Id. at 1354-55 (given the impossibility or impracticability of applying mandatory balance rules to working 
groups, the putative balance protection at ASTM may, in fact, be illusory). 
25 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 17, at 194-95. 
26 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 19; Admin. Conf. U.S., Recommendation 78-4: Federal Agency Interaction with 
Private Standard-Setting Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1978 
at 13 (1978). According to Professor Emily Bremer, the initial OMB Circular was the culmination of a long 
interagency effort to codify the procurement practices of individual federal agencies. 
27 Off. Mgt. Budget, Federal Participation In the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards; Final Issuance, 45 
Fed. Reg. 4326 (1980) [hereinafter OMB Circular A-119 (1980)]. 
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professional technical societies which develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary standards.” 28  
Federal agencies were encouraged to participate in voluntary standards bodies. 29 Standards 
bodies in which federal agencies participated, however, were required to comply with certain 
minimum “due process” criteria.30  These included, among other things, what appears to be an 
early “balance” requirement: 
 
Inviting representatives of a broadly-based group of persons likely to have an interest in 
the subject including, for example, consumers; small business concerns; manufacturers; 
labor; suppliers; distributors; industrial, institutional and other users; environmental and 
conservation groups; and State and local procurement and code officials.31 
 
 It is notable that this requirement places an emphasis on making the SDO open to all 
interested stakeholder groups, rather than enforcing any particular mix or numerical quota of 
representatives from different stakeholder categories. This approach is consistent with that of 
leading commentators of the period, who were of the view that “a good consensus process must 
allow review and approval by a balanced group in which no single interest is given 
disproportionate weight.”32  
 
In 1981, the President’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief reviewed OMB Circular A-119 
to determine whether it imposed unnecessary burdens on the public or private sectors.  Following 
this review, a draft revision of the Circular was published in the Federal Register on April 20, 
1982.33 After a 60-day public comment period, during which 120 comments were received, a 
final revision was published on October 26, 1982.34 
 
 The 1982 revision made a number of substantive changes to the Circular. Most 
importantly, it expanded the scope of the Circular from federal procurement activity to both 
federal procurement and regulatory activity.  In addition it eliminated the specified “due process” 
requirements for federal participation in voluntary standards organizations.  In response to public 
comments objecting to this removal, OMB responded that “the imposition of the mandatory 
procedures included in the previous editions of the Circular is inappropriate, burdensome and 
costly and … peripheral to the fundamental aims of the Circular”.35  The DOJ supported the 
elimination of the “rigid” 1980 due process requirements, but urged federal participants in 
standards-setting organizations to foster transparency and “open standards proceedings” to 
“mitigate the substantial anticompetitive potential inherent in private standards groups”.36  
 
                                                 
28 Id. § 4.e. 
29 Id. § 6.b. 
30 Id. § 6.c. See also Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1346 (applying the term “due process” broadly to a set of 
procedural protections). 
31 OMB Circular A-119 (1980), supra note 27, § 6.c. 
32 Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1346. 
33 47 Fed. Reg. 16,919 (1982). 
34 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496 (1982). 
35 Id. 
36 Letter dated June 22, 1982 from Ronald G. Carr, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
to Donald E. Sowle, Admin. for Federal Procurement Policy, OMB (reproduced at 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496). 
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The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also appeared to approve of an approach to 
standards development based on openness, while at the same time casting doubt on the 
effectiveness of formal “classification schemes” intended to mandate balance (e.g., the quota 
requirements imposed by ASTM).37 Echoing some of the concerns expressed in the 1970s,38 the 
FTC noted that quota schemes are seldom imposed on the working groups that actually formulate 
technical standards documents, the classification of individuals into particular categories is often 
imperfect, and there are ample other ways to skew the standardization process even when such 
balance requirements are present.39 
 
The Lasting Impact of Allied Tube 
 
 Around the time that the 1982 Circular was published, a case that drew significant 
attention to the principle of balance within SDOs began to work its way through the court 
system. The SDO in question was the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a large 
organization formed in 1896 to develop standards for fire safety equipment and systems. At the 
time, NFPA had approximately 30,000 members drawn from state and local governments, 
educational institutions, professional associations, manufacturers and users of fire-fighting 
equipment, and fire insurance companies.40 In addition to fire codes, NFPA is also responsible 
for the National Electrical Code (the NEC or Code), which establishes requirements for the 
design and installation of electrical wiring systems, many of which are adopted into local 
building codes and regulations.41  The facts of the controversy that ensued at NFPA, which are 
reproduced in detail below for illustrative purposes, are as follows:42 
 
Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical conduit, the hollow 
tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors of 
buildings. Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit 
made of steel, and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, 
[Indian Head, Inc. (IHI)] began to offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride… 
 
[IHI] initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit as an approved type of 
electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the 
Association's professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 
1980 annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the 
members present. Alarmed that, if approved, [IHI’s] product might pose a competitive 
threat to steel conduit, [Allied Tube], the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, met 
to plan strategy with, among others, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit 
manufacturers, and its independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude 
                                                 
37  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standards and Certification – Final Staff Report 159 (1983) (“for several reasons, 
classification schemes do not always achieve their intended effect.”) [hereinafter FTC 1983 Report].  
38 See note 21, supra, and accompanying text. 
39 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 37, at 159-64. 
40 Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1340 (“Manufacturers constitute about six and one-half percent and insurance 
companies eleven percent of NFPA's membership”). 
41 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1988) 
42 The facts underlying the famous Allied Tube case are but one of several controversies involving NFPA and its 
procedures during the 1980s.  See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 37, at 162-63 (citing additional complaints that 
NFPA’s “procedural rules governing standards development were exploited to thwart participation”). 
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[IHI’s] product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new 
Association members whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl 
chloride proposal. 
 
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the Association and to attend 
the annual meeting to vote against the proposal. [Allied Tube] alone recruited 155 
persons -- including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents' employees, 
employees from two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the wife of a 
national sales director. [Allied Tube] and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 
for the membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the annual 
meeting, the steel group voters were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by 
group leaders who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication. Few 
of the steel group voters had any of the technical documentation necessary to follow the 
meeting. None of them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the 
proposal to approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in 
opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 
390.43 
 
 Shortly after this vote, IHI brought suit against Allied Tube and other steel conduit 
manufacturers alleging that they had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by unreasonably 
restraining trade in the electrical conduit market. After a jury trial, a verdict was entered against 
Allied Tube and its co-defendants.44 But the verdict was nullified by the district court n.o.v. 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,45 and it was this issue that was eventually appealed to the 
Supreme Court in 1988 (IHI won on this point as well – the jury verdict against Allied Tube was 
reinstated).46  
 
But it is not the Noerr issue for which the Allied Tube case is remembered today. Rather, 
it is the Court’s dicta approving the jury’s finding of antitrust liability against Allied Tube and 
the other steel conduit manufacturers. Specifically, the Court recognizes that the “hope of 
procompetitive benefits [from standard-setting] depends upon the existence of safeguards 
sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic 
interests in restraining competition.” 47 It goes on to observe that “[w]hat [SDO members] may 
not do (without exposing itself to possible antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the 
[standard-setting] process by, as in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with 
decisionmakers sharing their economic interest in restraining competition.” 48  Thus, the Court 
recognized that an SDO member’s attempt to stack the deck to defeat a particular proposal or to 
gain some other economic advantage in standard-setting could be enough to result in a violation 
                                                 
43 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 496-97. 
44 Id. at 498. 
45 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961); United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965). 
46 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10 (“we hold that, at least where, as here, an economically interested party 
exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises 
market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the 
standard has of its own force in the marketplace.”) 
47 Id. at 509. 
48 Id. at 511. 
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of the Sherman Act. It is not enforced or quota-based “balance” in standard-setting that the Court 
encourages, but an avoidance of deliberate imbalance. 
 
In 1992, four years after the Allied Tube decision, OMB issued a new request for 
comments regarding Circular A-119. Several commenters suggested that the definitions in 
Circular A-119 were “ambiguous” and recommended changing them to reflect either the Court’s 
approach in Allied Tube or the definitions in the GATT Standards Code.  OMB declined to 
change the definitions in the Circular, noting that they “are not being misinterpreted and have 
served their purpose well”.49  A final revised version of the Circular was issued on October 26, 
1993 with no change to the balance requirement.50  
 
The NTTAA and the 1998 Revisions to OMB Circular A-119 
 
In 1996, President Clinton signed the National Technology Transfer and Advancement 
Act of 1995 (NTTAA).51 Among other things, the NTTAA embodied in statutory language the 
OMB Circular A-119 requirement that federal agencies “use technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.”52 Because the term “voluntary 
consensus standards body” was not expressly defined in the NTTAA, it was generally 
understood to refer to the definition contained in the Circular. 
 
The enactment of the NTTAA led to another review of the Circular, and on December 27, 
1996 OMB released a new draft version for public comment.53 Public hearings were held on 
February 10, 1997 and comments were received from over 50 sources.  OMB published the final 
revisions to the Circular on February 19, 1998.54 
 
The 1998 revisions of the Circular constitute a complete overhaul of the structure and 
language of the Circular, converting it to a “plain English” question-and-answer format.  It 
substantially altered the definition of “voluntary consensus standards body” from prior versions 
of the Circular.  The new definition reads as follows: 
 
A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes: 
 
(i) Openness. 
(ii) Balance of interest. 
(iii) Due process. 
(iv) An appeals process. 
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, 
and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections by interested parties …”55 
 
                                                 
49 58 Fed. Reg. 57,643 (1993). 
50 Id. 
51 Pub. Law 104-113 (1996). 
52 Id. at  § 12(d)(1). 
53 61 Fed. Reg. 68,312 (1996) 
54 63 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (1998). 
55 63 Fed. Reg. 8,554, § 4.a(1). 
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This definition differs significantly from the definition of “voluntary standards body” 
contained in each prior version of Circular A-119. Whereas earlier definitions simply referred to 
organizations that “develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary standards”, the 1998 definition 
imposes a new set of criteria defining such bodies, including openness, balance of interest, and 
due process. It is possible that the Supreme Court’s decision in Allied Tube influenced OMB in 
developing this new set of criteria for SDOs, particularly a formal requirement of “balance” 
(which would conceivably prevent the type of deck-stacking attempted by Allied and its co-
conspirators). But other than “consensus” none of the new terms (including “balance of interest”) 
was defined.56  
 
The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the standardization world witnessed a wave of 
litigation involving allegations of patent deception and ambush by Rambus, Inc.57 Among other 
things, Rambus was subject to an investigation and action by the Federal Trade Commission, 
which accused it of violations of both the Sherman Act and the FTC Act. These antitrust actions 
caused SDOs around the world to revisit their intellectual property policies and to consider their 
potential liability in such disputes.58 One of the outgrowths of this heightened awareness was the 
enactment in 2004 of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA),59 
which was intended to offer SDOs protection against certain types of antitrust liability that could 
arise from the actions of their members. 
 
Rather than craft a new legislative framework for this protection, Congress simply added 
SDOs to the types of entities already protected under the existing National Cooperative Research 
and Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA),60 which itself was an outgrowth of the earlier National 
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA). 61  When enacted the NCRA was intended to 
encourage innovation and promote trade by facilitating the participation of U.S. industries in 
R&D joint ventures.62 To achieve this goal, the NCRA offered two principal antitrust protections 
to qualifying “joint research and development ventures” – an immunity from treble damages 
under the antitrust laws63 and a requirement that the conduct of joint R&D by such entities be 
evaluated under the antitrust rule of reason and not be subject to per se liability.64 In 1993, given 
pressures on U.S. manufacturing industries, the protections of the NCRA were extended to joint 
production ventures.65  
                                                 
56 Several commenters in 1997 requested that OMB clarify these definitions, but OMB declined to do so. 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8,548, Item 28. 
57  See, generally, Renata B. Hesse & Frances Marshall, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 263, 
272-74 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
58 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 140. 
59 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Public Law 108–237 (2004), codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306. 
60 National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Public Law 103–42 (Jun. 10, 1993), codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. 
61 Public Law 98-462 (Oct. 11, 1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. § 4. 
64 Id. § 3. 
65 NCRPA, supra note 60. 
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 Under the NCRA, the “joint research and development ventures” protected under the Act 
are defined as “two or more persons” engaged in one of a variety of enumerated technical 
cooperation activities, and which did not engage in any of a list of prohibited anticompetitive 
activities.66 This definitional structure was preserved in the NCRPA. 67   Under the SDOAA, 
“standards development organizations” are added to the types of entities protected by the Act. It 
defines “standards development organization” as “a domestic or international organization that 
plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards using procedures that 
incorporate the attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and 
consensus in a manner consistent with the Office of Management and Budget Circular Number 
A–119, as revised February 10, 1998.” 68 Like the 1998 circular, the SDO balance requirement 
under the SDOAA is not defined. 
 
However, the preamble to the SDOAA elaborates on the due process requirements of 
OMB Circular A-119, noting in particular that the “balance” requirement provides for “balancing 
interests so that standards development activities are not dominated by any single group of 
interested persons.” 69 This “non-domination” balance requirement, which must be read into the 
text of the SDOAA, is distinctly not a quota requirement.  That is, the SDOAA does not mandate 
that SDOs ensure that all or every conceivable interest group be represented in SDO decision 
making, but only that SDO deliberations are not “dominated” by any single group. This 
requirement of non-domination echoes the cautionary language of the Supreme Court in Allied 
Tube, which warned against “stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers 
sharing their economic interest in restraining competition.”70 
 
 
The 2016 Revision of OMB Circular A-119 
 
In 2012, OMB again invited public commentary on Circular A-119.71 After releasing a 
draft revision in 2014, OMB published the final revised version of Circular A-119 in January 
2016.72 It includes the following provision: 
 
Balance: The standards development process should be balanced. Specifically, there 
should be meaningful involvement from a broad range of parties, with no single interest 
dominating the decision-making.73 
 
                                                 
66 NCRA, supra note 61, § 2(6). 
67 NCRPA, supra note 60. 
68 Id. § 103(1)(8). Interestingly, the SDOAA (both at the time of its enactment and today) expressly incorporates 
the 1998 version of OMB Circular A-119 into its definition of “standards development organization”. Thus, it is 
not clear that definitions from subsequent versions of the Circular (e.g., the 2016 version, discussed below) are 
actually incorporated into the SDOAA. 
69 Id. § 102(5)(C). 
70 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 511,  
71 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (2012). 
72 81 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (2016), referencing Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-119: Federal 
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment 
Activities, Jan. 22, 2016. 
73 Id. § 2(e)(ii). 
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 The 2016 version of the Circular encourages “meaningful involvement” not from all 
affected stakeholder groups, but from “a broad range” of parties. This requirement avoids 
formal quota language, as it does not specify that decision making bodies should be composed 
of particular proportions of different stakeholder groups. Rather, the balance to be attained 
appears more flexible.  
 
In addition, the Circular echoes the “non-domination” language of the 2004 SDOAA. It 
prohibits any “single interest from dominating the decision-making.” And, like the SDOAA 
and the 1998 Circular, this requirement harkens back to the Supreme Court’s message in Allied 
Tube – when a group of economically-interested parties tilts the playing field to their own 
advantage, antitrust liability may arise.  This does not mean, however, that an SDO must take 




Balance and the ANSI Essential Requirements 
 
In considering SDO balance requirements, it is also informative to review the “due 
process” requirements established by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which 
serves as the accreditation body for developers of American National Standards.  While ANSI 
accredits more than 200 individual SDOs, not all U.S.-based SDOs are ANSI-accredited (notable 
omissions including IETF and W3C), and virtually no foreign-based SDOs are accredited. 
Nevertheless, ANSI’s “Due Process Requirements for American National Standards,” better 
known as the ANSI Essential Requirements, are widely cited, and contain balance requirements 
that are useful to contrast with those of Circular A-119 and the SDOAA.74 
 
At a high level, the ANSI Essential Requirements echo the “due process” requirements of 
OMB Circular A-119. Thus, they provide that a developer of American National Standards must 
operate according to principles of openness, lack of dominance, balance, consensus and 
appeals.75 In terms of balance, however, ANSI has adopted a semi-structured approach falling 
somewhere between the rigid quota requirements of ASTM and the unstructured requirement of 
Circular A-119 and the SDOAA. 
 
Section 1.3 of the Essential Requirements, which establishes at the outset that “The 
standards development process should have a balance of interests”, imposes the following 
affirmative requirements on accredited SDOs: 
 
Participants from diverse interest categories shall be sought with the objective of 
achieving balance. If a consensus body lacks balance in accordance with the 
historical criteria for balance, and no specific alternative formulation of balance 
                                                 
74  The ANSI Essential Requirements were first adopted in 2003, but draw from a variety of earlier policy 
documents.  For example, ANSI’s 1974 procedures manual includes the following requirement relating to balance: 
“A reasonable balance of membership among organizations, companies, and public interest shall be maintained.” 
Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures Manual for Management and Coordination of American National Standards 
§ 1.4.2 (Dec. 5, 1974). The author is grateful to Emily Bremer for drawing my attention to this document. 
75 Am. Natl. Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National 
Standards 4 (2019). 
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was approved by the ANSI Executive Standards Council, outreach to achieve 
balance shall be undertaken. 
 
The “historical criteria” referred to above are set out in Section 2.3 which provides: 
 
Historically the criteria for balance are that a) no single interest category 
constitutes more than one-third of the membership of a consensus body dealing 
with safety-related standards or b) no single interest category constitutes a 
majority of the membership of a consensus body dealing with other than safety-
related standards. 
 
In defining an “interest category”, ANSI notes that such categories may vary from case to 
case, being “a function of the nature of the standards being developed”. Though not strictly 
required, three interest categories are suggested: producer, user76 and general interest. However, 
the door is left open “where appropriate” for the consideration of additional interest categories 
including consumer; directly affected public; distributor and retailer; industrial/commercial; 
insurance; labor; manufacturer; professional society; regulatory agency; testing laboratory; and 
trade association.77 
 
In addition, ANSI includes a separate non-domination requirement in Section 1.2 of the 
Essential Requirements: 
 
The standards development process shall not be dominated by any single interest 
category, individual or organization. Dominance means a position or exercise of 
dominant authority, leadership, or influence by reason of superior leverage, 
strength, or representation to the exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of 
other viewpoints. 
 
Putting these pieces together, the ANSI Essential Requirements impose an affirmative 
duty on accredited SDOs to seek participants from diverse interest categories, and that if balance 
does not exist, the SDO must undertake outreach to achieve that balance. Conversely, dominance 
by any single interest category must be avoided. These requirements, while falling short of 
formal quotas, go further, and impose more stringent affirmative requirements on SDOs than 
OMB Circular A-119 or the SDOAA.  
  
 
 Practical Balance 
 
 Despite the potential benefit of qualifying as a “voluntary consensus standards body” 
under OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA, some SDOs have steadfastly refused to adopt any 
                                                 
76 Four different sub-categories of “user” are defined based on the type of standard being produced: consumer, 
industrial, government and labor. 
77 Interestingly, despite several recent disputes involving allegations that Patent-Centric SDO members have been 
oppressed by Product-Centric members at ANSI-accredited SDOs, ANSI’s non-exhaustive list of potential interest 
categories does not include Patent-Centric firms (at least as of its most recent iteration in 2019). Another omitted 
category, which was noted in the FTC 1983 Report, supra note 37, at 158, is foreign manufacturers. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454894 
[Draft 31 Jul. 2019] Contreras - Balance Page 13 
formal balance requirement in their rules and policies. The most notable of these holdouts is the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which emphasizes its openness to all interested 
parties,78 but which does not impose any formal requirements of balance on its deliberations.79 
The IETF explained in its 2012 comments to OMB its belief that a balance requirement “is 
largely duplicative of the "openness" and "due process" prongs of the definition [of voluntary 
consensus standards body]”. 80  It further noted that IETF is widely acknowledged by both 
federal agencies and academic commentators to be an exceptionally open and democratic 
body. 81  As such, IETF contends that it achieves a high degree of balance through the 
mechanism of openness – what may be termed “practical balance”. This approach, while not 
achieving the degree of numerical balancing that could be achieved under a quota system, has 
resulted in a long-standing, effective and widely-admired standardization process.  
 
 Moreover, even without formal balance requirements, some SDOs have taken positive 
steps to encourage participation by diverse stakeholder groups including consumers and civil 
society. 82  IETF, through its parent organization the Internet Society, regularly funds the 
participation in IETF standardization activities of individuals from developing countries.83 
 
A Hierarchy of Balance Mechanisms 
 
From the above discussion emerges a four-tier hierarchy among SDO balance 
mechanisms. First, the intentional unbalancing of SDO deliberations through tactics such as 
those alleged in Allied Tube – packing the room with unqualified individuals, paying for 
individuals to attend SDO meetings solely for the purpose of voting, and otherwise corrupting 
the legitimate deliberative process – smacks of the worst abuses of labor racketeering and 
should clearly be sanctionable under the antitrust laws. This is a baseline requirement for all 
SDOs.84 Facilitating an abusive imbalance in SDO decision making processes is prohibited to 
all. 
 
Beyond this baseline, however, degrees of stakeholder balance reflect the preferences of 
different SDOs. Both OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA prohibit domination of SDO 
deliberative processes by a single interest group. Certainly, some degree of single-group 
domination might give rise to antitrust liability. But not all instances of single-group 
domination are anticompetitive.  SDOs that wish to take advantage of the liability safe harbors 
under the SDOAA or that wish to have their standards accepted by federal agencies in their 
                                                 
78 See Letter dated Apr. 29, 2012 from Jorge L. Contreras, Russ Housley and Bernard Aboba to Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, at 2 [hereinafter IETF Letter] (“The IETF 
is completely open to newcomers, and has no membership fee or other membership requirements.”) 
79 IETF has, by choice, never sought accreditation by ANSI. 
80 IETF Letter, supra note 78, at 4. 
81 Id. 
82 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 120.  
83 See Jorge L. Contreras, National Disparities and Standards-Essential Patents: Considerations for India in 
COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND COMPETITION 
ISSUES  (Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Deviah & Indranath Gupta, eds., Springer: 2017). 
84 I borrow this terminology from the JRC Report, supra note 7, at 139-40 (discussing “baseline” IPR policy terms 
that are largely dictated by legal and administrative requirements). 
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procurement or regulatory functions must avoid such domination. But failing to do so, by itself, 
is not actionable under the antitrust laws. 
 
And beyond the non-domination requirements imposed under the SDOAA and Circular 
A-119 are even more stringent balance requirements that can voluntarily be adopted by SDOs. 
Two approaches of increasing stringency include those adopted by ANSI, which imposes on its 
accredited SDOs an affirmative obligation to ensure some degree of balance among an 
unspecified mix of stakeholder groups, and by ASTM, which imposes a strict numerical quota 
requirements on its deliberative bodies. Again, these third and fourth-level balance 
requirements are not required by law Rather, they are policy design preferences expressed by 
SDOs.85 In the case of ANSI, only SDOs that elect to seek ANSI accreditation must comply, 
and in the case of ASTM, such requirements are imposed purely by choice of the SDO’s 
governing body as representative of its membership.  
 
The hierarchy of balance mechanisms is summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 
Hierarchy of SDO Balance Requirements 
 
Tier Nature of Balance 
Requirement 
Source Applies to 
1 No abusive imbalance Allied Tube All SDOs 
2 Non-domination SDOAA,  
OMB Circular A-
119 
SDOs wishing to take 
advantage of statutory 
benefits under SDOAA 
and OMB Circular A-119 




SDOs that wish to be 
accredited by ANSI 
4 Numerical quotas ASTM SDOs that desire 
minimum representation 






At some level, balance in SDO decision making is an expected and important aspect of 
collaborative standardization. But beyond a baseline prohibition on abusive attempts to skew 
the process per Allied Tube, the imposition of balance requirements on SDOs is not legally 
mandated. SDOs may select, based on their different policy preferences, risk aversion and 
stakeholder composition, what degree of balance they wish to enforce.  In some SDOs, such as 
IETF, the SDO may desire to impose no such balance requirements, relying instead on 
openness and transparency to ensure a fair and legitimate process. SDOs that wish their 
standards to be adopted by federal agencies must comply with the non-domination balance 
                                                 
85 Using the terminology of the JRC Report, these would be “baseline-plus” policies. See JRC Report, supra note 
7, at 145-46. 
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requirements of OMB Circular A-119, and those that wish to benefit from the liability 
protections of the SDOAA must do the same. Those that wish to be accredited by ANSI, must 
adhere to the affirmative balancing obligations set forth in its Essential Requirements, and 
others, such as ASTM, may wish to impose strict numerical quotas on participation by different 
interest groups. The resulting diversity in SDO policy outcomes is a sign not of disagreement, 
but of a healthy organizational ecosystem in which policy experimentation and preference 
signaling are robust.86  
 
In assessing the balance requirements of SDO policies, it is important to remember that 
an SDO’s failure to abide by the more stringent balance requirements described in Tiers 2-4 
above should not be confused with a violation of the law. Antitrust liability should be imposed 
only when the relatively high threshold for liability established by cases such as Allied Tube 
has been established. In all other cases, differences in SDO balance requirements should be 
viewed as expressing the policy preferences of SDOs and their members. This approach is 
consistent with both the regulatory history of SDO balance requirements in the U.S. as well as 
the Supreme Court’s leading precedent in this area and, as such, itself exemplifies a balanced 
approach to the legal regulation of SDOs. 
 
                                                 
86 See JRC Report, supra note 7, at 79-80 and 158-60 (describing experimental approach among SDOs in the 
development of IPR policies and resulting policy diversity). 
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